“Brexit did deep damage.” With those words at her Mais lecture, Chancellor Rachel Reeves made plain an important shift within the Labour Party—one ministers have been signalling for some time.
“Let me say this directly to our friends and allies in Europe. This government believes a deeper relationship is in the interest of the whole of Europe,” she said, while insisting the government was not trying to “turn back the clock” on Brexit.
Speaking so openly about Brexit’s harms reflects a belief that, as the government tries to revive the sluggish economy, it must be more ambitious in “resetting” the UK’s post‑Brexit relationship with the EU. Labour’s 2024 manifesto proposed renegotiating parts of the 2020 Trade and Co‑operation Agreement, notably to end EU customs checks on food and agricultural exports by aligning UK rules with EU regulations. But it kept clear red lines: no return to the single market, customs union, freedom of movement, or any suggestion of rejoining the EU.
That stance grew out of the party’s heavy defeat in 2019. After that calamity Labour accepted the leave result and backed Johnson’s TCA. But the tone has shifted. After last autumn’s Budget, Sir Keir Starmer said “Brexit had significantly hurt our economy” and argued Britain should “keep moving towards a close relationship with the EU.” This suggested Labour now believes that to turn around the economy it must be bolder about the reset.
Some ministers have gone further. Health Secretary Wes Streeting said he was “glad that Brexit is a problem whose name we now dare speak,” arguing being outside the EU makes growth harder to deliver. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy called it “self‑evident” that Brexit damaged the economy and pointed to Turkey’s customs agreement as an example of economic benefit. London Mayor Sadiq Khan has urged rejoining the customs union and single market and campaigning to rejoin the EU.
Reeves, while reiterating manifesto red lines, signalled the government wants to align regulation with the EU where it serves Britain’s interest—something she framed as key to delivering the economic growth Labour promised but has yet to achieve. Economic performance has improved only slightly: growth was 1.3% in 2025 versus 1.1% in 2024, below official forecasts.
These moves have political implications. Will pursuing a closer EU relationship alienate Brexit‑backing voters? Or has the political front line shifted so Labour can change tack without electoral disaster?
Reconnect with working‑class voters
Labour’s current stance was born of painful lessons. After losing in 2019 when it proposed renegotiation and a referendum, the party concluded it could not win without reconnecting with working‑class voters—many of whom backed Leave in 2016 and switched to Johnson in 2019, helping collapse the “Red Wall” in the Midlands and North.
Yet although Labour won in 2024, it made little progress between 2019 and 2024 in reconnecting with working‑class Leave voters. British Election Study and NatCen data suggest some 80% of Labour’s support in 2024 came from people who said they would vote to rejoin the EU—only slightly below 2019 levels. Labour was better at winning over 2019 Tory voters who favour rejoining than at winning Leave supporters.
Nearly two years on, the party is in worse electoral shape than in 2019. Polls now put Labour on average at just 19%. It trails Reform, whose support is largely Brexit‑backing, by eight points; about one in 10 2024 Labour voters now support Nigel Farage’s party. But Reform is not the main source of Labour’s decline. For every voter who has switched from Labour to Reform since 2024, almost twice as many (19%) have gone to the Greens; another 8% went to the Liberal Democrats. Most who moved to Greens or Lib Dems are pro‑rejoin, while those switching to Reform nearly all back staying out of the EU.
Labour’s vote is down nine points since 2024 among Leave supporters, but down 19 points among Remain supporters. That makes clear: Labour cannot restore its fortunes simply by appealing to Brexit‑backers. It also needs to win back pro‑EU voters who defected to parties that favour reversing Brexit.
Labour voters on rejoining the EU
What underpinned Labour’s previous Brexit strategy? The party presumed a reset short of rejoining would please pro‑EU supporters while not alienating its minority of Brexiteers. In June, 76% of 2024 Labour voters told YouGov they supported “a closer relationship with the European Union, without rejoining… the Single Market, or the Customs Union.” Only 11% opposed.
But that doesn’t mean the reset is less popular than rejoining. The same YouGov poll found 82% of Labour voters supported “Britain rejoining the European Union.” More recently, 73% of 2024 Labour voters supported “starting negotiations for Britain to rejoin the European Union,” with 18% opposed. These figures show substantial appetite among Labour supporters for a definitive return to the EU.
Core elements of Labour’s approach
The central plank of Labour’s reset has been removing customs checks on UK exports of food and agricultural products to the EU, via regulatory alignment. Initial polling suggested this was popular: 63% of 2024 Labour voters told BMG they supported negotiating a “veterinary agreement” to remove paperwork on food and drink exports, with only 10% opposed.
But results change when trade‑offs are explicit. Redfield & Wilton asked whether it would be better if the UK followed EU laws for food (and British food sold abroad did not face EU border checks) or if the UK followed its own laws (and British exports did face checks). Labour voters only narrowly favoured aligning with the EU (45%) over keeping UK rules and facing checks (40%). Such divergence shows Labour cannot assume its reset will automatically win voter approval even if talks succeed.
Much depends on persuasion. Reform and the Conservatives will portray a reset as a betrayal—returning rule‑making to Brussels rather than Westminster. Polling suggests Labour supporters are not wholly immune to that argument; the trade‑offs are evident to many.
Conclusion
Labour’s shift from prioritising Leaver voters to trying to regain Remainers reflects both electoral realities and economic urgency. The party faces significant losses among pro‑EU voters to Greens and Lib Dems and modest gains among Leave voters. To rebuild its electoral coalition it must convince sceptical supporters that regulatory alignment and a closer relationship with the EU serve Britain’s economic interest without surrendering core manifesto red lines. Whether Labour can sell those trade‑offs in the face of hostile framing remains the central political challenge.
John Curtice is Professor of Politics, Strathclyde University, and Senior Fellow, National Centre for Social Research, and The UK in a Changing Europe
Top picture credits: Getty Images and Reuters
