The Middle East conflict is reviving familiar energy anxieties across Europe, exposing weaknesses left over from the shock of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Four years after EU leaders vowed never again to be so dependent on a single supplier, Europe faces fresh price shocks, political strain and hard choices about short-term relief versus long-term security.
In 2022 the EU moved fast to cut ties with Russian gas, oil and coal. Only about 2% of the bloc’s oil imports now come from Russia, confined to Hungary and Slovakia, and the EU plans to end all Russian gas imports, including LNG, by next year. That pivot reduced one dependency but created new ones: Europe is now heavily reliant on the US and Norway for energy.
The US has become the largest single supplier of LNG to the EU, accounting for roughly 57% of EU LNG imports. Germany, for example, now takes nearly all its LNG from the US. That dependence has political consequences. Since President Trump returned to the White House, he has used trade and energy leverage to pressure the EU—threatening tariffs until the bloc agreed to buy more US energy. The Commission president signed a deal worth $750bn over three years to import US oil, LNG and nuclear technologies, in return for reduced tariffs. Yet questions remain about whether EU demand or US export capacity can sustain such volumes—and whether reliance on a single democratic partner carries its own strategic risks.
The recent attacks in the Gulf and Iran’s effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have underlined Europe’s vulnerability to global market turmoil. The strait is a crucial oil transit route; even though Europe does not buy large volumes of Middle Eastern oil or gas directly, global price spikes ripple through international markets. On one morning in early March, oil rose about 8% and European gas prices jumped roughly 20% after the crisis intensified.
Experts warn that relying on LNG exposes Europe to volatile global prices. Dan Marks of RUSI says Europe can likely secure supplies because it can outbid others in a crisis, but that raises costs and undermines competitiveness. He warns of “layering of risk”: the US could prioritize domestic consumption, infrastructure could be hit by extreme weather, or political shifts could cut supplies. Norway, Europe’s largest gas supplier—providing about a third of the EU’s annual gas and half of the UK’s—offers an allylier source, but Oslo says it is near maximum output and expanding supply would require fresh investment and new exploration. Norway also pressures Brussels to relax plans limiting Arctic oil and gas development, highlighting tensions between climate goals and energy security.
The political impact in Europe is acute. Governments that already shouldered emergency energy support during the 2022 shock now fear backlash from voters over renewed price rises. EU leaders are debating short-term fixes—tax reviews, consumer price caps and targeted support for industry—at an upcoming summit. Ursula von der Leyen has called for immediate relief to reduce the cost impact on households.
But the crisis is also fueling divisions within the EU about the longer-term strategy. Some politicians and parts of industry argue for normalising relations with Russia to regain cheaper supplies; Belgium’s Bart De Wever publicly suggested reopening ties, a stance echoed privately by some German industrialists and the hard-right AfD. Others want to double down on green transition measures. Central and Eastern European states resist tightening emissions rules that could raise costs, while Spain, Sweden and Denmark warn that weakening the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) would reward polluters and penalise firms that have invested in decarbonisation. Italy and Austria want to limit the ETS’s impact on electricity prices; Italy’s Giorgia Meloni has called to suspend ETS application to power generation.
The EU faces trade-offs. Georg Zachmann of Bruegel says Europe needs realistic long-term plans—more renewables, nuclear and electrification—but acknowledges the political sensitivity around costs. He points to wasted potential, such as underused solar opportunities in sunny southern Europe, and questions whether ambitious targets for 2030 and 2040 are fully credible given current political constraints.
There are lessons to be learned from China, where energy security policies have emphasised electrification to reduce exposure to volatile oil and gas markets. China derives a larger share of final energy consumption from electricity than the EU and has pushed electric vehicles aggressively. The result is lower vulnerability to oil shocks. Europe’s fragmented politics, by contrast, mean that crises are used to argue for opposing solutions rather than forging consensus on a coherent electrification and decarbonisation path.
Brexit complicates matters too. Energy experts on both sides of the Channel see benefits to closer EU–UK cooperation—Britain has Europe’s largest offshore wind fleet and major plans for the North Sea—but lingering political distrust and differences over legal oversight hamper faster integration, even where economic logic points to cooperation.
Will this latest shock be a genuine turning point for Europe’s energy security? Every crisis creates that hope, but history is sobering. Marks points to repeated cycles—1970s-80s efforts to reduce dependency were overtaken by new vulnerabilities. The current moment may spur short-term relief measures at the EU summit, but whether leaders muster the unity and political will to invest in long-term resilience—diversifying supply, building strategic stockpiles, accelerating electrification and renewables, and reforming market structures—remains uncertain.
The immediate reality is a contest between urgent political pressures to shield consumers and businesses, and the slower, costlier work of reshaping Europe’s energy system to be both secure and green. The Iran war has exposed that Europe remains exposed to geopolitical shocks; the challenge is choosing policies that do not simply swap one dependency for another, but build durable autonomy while meeting climate commitments.
