Chancellor Rachel Reeves’s remark at the Mais lecture — “Brexit did deep damage” — marks an unmistakable change in Labour’s approach. Ministers have been hinting at this for some time: the party is now more willing to say openly that leaving the EU harmed the economy and to consider a bolder “reset” of the post‑Brexit relationship with Europe, while stopping short of undoing Brexit itself.
Reeves stressed that the government wants a “deeper relationship” with the EU where it benefits the UK, but she reiterated firm red lines: no return to the single market or customs union, and no reinstatement of freedom of movement or re‑entry to the EU. Labour’s 2024 manifesto offered targeted renegotiation of parts of the 2020 Trade and Co‑operation Agreement — notably seeking to remove EU customs checks on food and agricultural exports by aligning UK rules with those in the EU — as a way to reduce frictions and boost growth.
That shift is rooted in the party’s reading of the political and economic landscape. After the heavy defeat in 2019 Labour accepted the Leave vote and backed Boris Johnson’s TCA. But more recently leaders have been more forthright about Brexit’s economic cost. Sir Keir Starmer has said Brexit “had significantly hurt our economy” and argued for moving “towards a close relationship with the EU” to help revive sluggish performance. Other ministers have been even clearer: Health Secretary Wes Streeting welcomed the fact that Labour is now willing to name Brexit as a problem for growth; Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy has called the economic damage “self‑evident,” while London Mayor Sadiq Khan has advocated rejoining the customs union and single market and campaigned for EU re‑entry.
Reeves framed regulatory alignment with the EU as a pragmatic tool to deliver the economic growth Labour promised. So far macroeconomic progress has been modest: growth edged up from 1.1% in 2024 to 1.3% in 2025, still below official expectations. That underlines why Labour sees a closer relationship with the EU as part of a growth strategy.
The political consequences of this reorientation are complex. Labour risks alienating Brexit‑backing voters, yet the party’s real electoral problem lies elsewhere: it has lost many pro‑EU supporters to parties explicitly committed to reversing Brexit.
Reconnect with working‑class voters
Labour’s previous strategy grew out of painful lessons in 2019, when pledging renegotiation and a referendum failed to win enough support among working‑class Leave voters. Winning back those voters remained a priority. But the data from the 2024 election suggest Labour’s recovery focused more on pro‑rejoin voters than on winning over Leave supporters. Studies by the British Election Study and NatCen indicate roughly 80% of Labour’s 2024 voters said they would support rejoining the EU — a share only marginally lower than in 2019. Labour performed better at attracting 2019 Tory voters who favour rejoining than at reclaiming Leave supporters.
Since the 2024 election Labour’s position has weakened. Average poll ratings have fallen to around 19%, with Reform — a party whose support is heavily Brexit‑backing — ahead by about eight points in some measures. Around one in ten 2024 Labour voters now say they support Nigel Farage’s party. But Reform does not account for Labour’s full decline. For each voter who has switched from Labour to Reform, nearly twice that number moved to the Greens, and a further minority moved to the Liberal Democrats. Most defectors to the Greens and Lib Dems are pro‑rejoin, while those moving to Reform overwhelmingly support staying out of the EU.
Crucially, Labour’s share of Leave voters has fallen by around nine points since 2024, but its share among Remain voters has fallen by about 19 points. In other words, Labour cannot rebuild its electoral coalition simply by chasing Leave‑backers; recovering pro‑EU voters who went to Greens and Lib Dems is equally important.
Labour voters and rejoining the EU
Labour’s earlier reset strategy assumed a compromise — closer ties with the EU short of rejoining — would satisfy most supporters without losing Leave voters. A YouGov survey in June found 76% of 2024 Labour voters favoured “a closer relationship with the European Union, without rejoining the Single Market or the Customs Union,” and just 11% opposed that position.
But other polling paints a different picture of appetite for re‑entry. The same YouGov questions showed a majority of Labour supporters also expressed support for Britain rejoining the EU: 82% in one poll backed rejoining, while a more recent poll found 73% of 2024 Labour voters supported “starting negotiations for Britain to rejoin the European Union,” with 18% opposed. These findings suggest substantial latent support within Labour’s base for a more definitive return to the EU, complicating the party’s effort to thread a narrow reset needle.
Core elements of Labour’s reset
At the centre of Labour’s practical proposals is removing paperwork and checks on UK food and agricultural exports to the EU by aligning UK veterinary and food standards with those of the EU. Early polling showed this specific idea was popular: 63% of 2024 Labour voters told BMG they supported negotiating a “veterinary agreement” to remove export paperwork, with only 10% opposed.
However, support softens when trade‑offs are made explicit. Research by Redfield & Wilton presented respondents with a clear choice: either align UK food laws with the EU so British exports avoid EU border checks, or keep UK rules and accept that exports would face checks. Among Labour voters the split was narrow: 45% favoured alignment and 40% preferred retaining UK rules despite checks. That fine margin demonstrates Labour cannot rely on automatic backing for a reset even if negotiators secure concessions.
Political framing will matter. Conservatives and Reform will depict any regulatory alignment as ceding control to Brussels and betraying sovereignty. Polling indicates many Labour supporters are receptive to that framing when the trade‑offs are spelled out.
Conclusion
Labour’s shift from prioritising Leavers to trying to win back Remainers reflects both electoral realities and economic urgency. The party has lost a substantial number of pro‑EU voters to the Greens and Liberal Democrats, while only making modest gains among Leave supporters. To rebuild a winning coalition Labour must persuade sceptical voters that selective regulatory alignment and a closer EU relationship will boost Britain’s economy without violating its manifesto red lines. Selling those trade‑offs against hostile political framing will be the party’s central challenge in the coming years.
John Curtice is Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde and Senior Fellow at the National Centre for Social Research and The UK in a Changing Europe
Top picture credits: Getty Images and Reuters