An investigation by the Sentry finds that state-sanctioned fuel smuggling between 2022 and 2024 deprived Libya of roughly $20 billion in revenue and calls for targeted international sanctions and a western-backed probe of the officials involved. The report concludes that politicians and security figures who publicly present themselves as defenders of the state instead helped build and run an extensive fuel-smuggling apparatus, sometimes with foreign support. Some of the diverted fuel also flowed into Sudan, where it has helped sustain that country’s conflict.
The Sentry says the smuggling escalated sharply after leadership changes at the National Oil Corporation (NOC). The NOC introduced a swap system exchanging abundant Libyan crude for imported refined fuel. Instead of entering the subsidised domestic market, a large share of those imports was resold abroad for profit. NOC imports rose from about 20.4 million litres per day in early 2021 to more than 41 million litres per day by late 2024. The investigators argue no real increase in domestic consumption could explain that jump and estimate that over half the imported petrol was diverted into private criminal networks. Libya’s refining capacity remains very limited, making the import volumes especially anomalous.
For 2024 alone, the Sentry estimates more than $6.7 billion worth of fuel was smuggled out of the country — an amount that would have more than tripled government spending on health and education. The report frames the activity not merely as corruption symptomatic of weak institutions but as a systematic strategy embraced by top rulers from 2021 onward to siphon state wealth. Kleptocrats and organised crime groups, working with corrupt officials who control bureaucracy, logistical hubs, distribution points and border crossings, coordinated large-scale illegal exports to destinations including Sudan, Chad, Niger, Tunisia, Albania, Malta, Italy and Turkey.
Shipments moved by sea, road tankers, smaller vehicles and even illicit pipelines, depending on the route. The outflows produced domestic shortages and forced citizens, especially in remote areas, to buy fuel from unofficial sellers at much higher prices. The Sentry warns the scheme deprived the Central Bank of vital dollar revenues and damaged the NOC’s credibility; hydrocarbon sales account for virtually all of Libya’s income.
The surge occurred while Farhat Bengdara chaired the NOC; he left the role in January after about 30 months. The NOC says it ended the swap system in March 2025 and reported an 8% drop in fuel quality from January to September compared with the previous year. External experts, however, say Libya still imports far more fuel than it could plausibly consume.
Bengdara told the Sentry that the NOC had acted transparently and cooperated with national and international bodies, and that he proposed reforms to reduce reliance on subsidised diesel — including boosting gas production, expanding gas and renewable power, and gradually removing fuel subsidies. The Sentry recommends coordinated international pressure, sanctions on those most responsible, and assistance to Libyan investigators so domestic institutions can identify and hold accountable the officials who diverted state funds.